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NOTES
COMMISSIONS ON REALTY: A LOOSE END IN PENNSYLVANIA'S DECEDENTS' ESTATES REFORM
Prior to the Fiduciaries Act of 1949 1 the personal representative had
no power or authority over a decedent's real estate unless such authority
was specifically given to him by will, or unless it was necessary to sell all
or a part of the real estate to pay the decedent's debts or the legacies
enumerated in the will. As a consequence he was entitled to compensation
for services in regard to the real estate of the decedent only when he
effected a sale of the property acting under authority from one or the
other of these sources. 2 But the 1949 Act has to a great extent assimilated
the administration of realty and personalty and has significantly increased
8
the duties of the personal representative in regard to the real property.
This raises the question of what compensation the executor or administrator should receive for assuming this added work and responsibility. In
the majority of jurisdictions the answer is provided by statutes which set
definite rates of compensation. But in Pennsylvania the compensation to
be awarded the personal representative has always been a matter in the
discretion of the court. The purpose of this note is to analyze the decisions
where the compensation of fiduciaries has been litigated in order to draw
some conclusions which may be helpful in providing an answer to the
,above question. It is of course true that in the majority of cases the compensation which the personal representative is to receive is not litigated.
As a result, the rules evoked in the litigated cases are in many situations
not followed in practice. But in the main they do provide the pattern for
practice and hence are a starting point for determining what the compensation of a personal representative should be in any new situation.
Additional aid can be derived from an examination of the statutes in other
states where the rate of compensation is arrived at by legislative fiat.
PERSONAL PROPERTY

Theory of Compensation.-At common law the only property subject
to administration by the personal representative was personalty. 4 After
the payment of debts and legacies, the early English law gave the executor
1. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, §§ 320.101-320.1401 (Purdon, 1950).
2. See Stafford Estate, 24 Erie 189 (1942), aff'd, 152 Pa. Super. 551, 33 A.2d
78 (1943); Fiduciary Review, June 1948, p. 1.
3. For an analysis of the Act see Eckert, The Penisylvania FiduciariesAct of
1949, 11 Pitt. L. Rev. 194 (1950) ; Hutton, The FiduciariesAct of 1949, 54 DIcK. L.
REV. 26 (1949); Note, The Pennsylvania FiduciariesAct of 1949, 99 U. OF PA. L.
Rav. 1164 (1951).
4. 2 WOERNER, AmERIcAN LAW OF ADMINISTRATION 629 (3d ed. 1923).
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or administrator the surplus of this part of the estate.5 But at that time
the position was purely honorary and this was not considered to be compensation for services. As a result, if there was no surplus personal
estate, the personal representative received no compensation for the work
and responsibility he had undertaken, unless provision had been made for
him in the will. 6 This early rule permitting the executor to take the
surplus of the personal estate had developed at a time when personal
estates were small and this remainder no doubt furnished a fair compen7
sation for services rendered, although it was not looked on as such.
Because it seemed an unnatural inference that property which was
not expressly disposed of in the will should go to the executor, the doctrine
came to be looked on with disfavor.8 This feeling against such disposition
of the surplus was an influential factor in the determination that this doctrine of English law had not been received as a part of Pennsylvania law.9
In so deciding, the court noted the fact that from an early date it had become customary to allow executors and administrators compensation for
their work as a charge against a decedent's estate in all cases, contrary to
the English view. 10 The value of giving the personal representative assurance of compensation was articulated at a later date when it was said that
it would mean the fiduciary would be inclined to do a better job and at
the same time could be held to a higher standard." Today, in the great
majority of states such compensation is authorized by statute,' 2 but in
Pennsylvania there is no such statute. Instead, the courts determine what
compensation the personal representative shall receive. Such a procedure
has been justified as an incident of the power of the court to compel the
personal representative to account as the court should "award and order."
This power was interpreted as allowing the court to award a reasonable
fee to the personal representative for his trouble, out of the assets of the
13
estate over which the court had jurisdiction.
Measure of Compensation.-The stated criterion of the amount of compensation has been traditional: the amount awarded is to be a fair return
for the time, labor, trouble, and responsibility which has been incurred by
4
the personal representative in the settlement of the decedent's estate.'
5. See Wilson v. Wilson, 3 Binn. 557, 559, 562 (Pa. 1811). Fleer, Real Estate
Administration in A Decedent's Estate, Fiduciary Review June 1948, pp. 1, 2.
6. 2 WOERNER, AmRIcAN LAW OF ADMINISTRATION 1160 (2d ed. 1899).
7. See Wilson v. Wilson, 3 Binn. 557, 560 (Pa. 1811).
8. Thus if the will made express provisions for the executor it was held that he
was not entitled to the surplus. See Wilson v. Wilson, supra note 7. And at a later
date in England it was enacted that the surplus should not be taken beneficially by the
executor unless the intent was so expressed in the will. 1 WIl.. 4, c. 40 (1830).
9. Wilson v. Wilson, 3 Binn. 557 (Pa. 1811).
10. Ibid.
11. Clark's Estate, 10 Pa. Dist. 378 (1901).
12. See 10 ST. Louis L. Rzv. 225 (1925).
13. Wilson v. Wilson, 3 Binn. 557, 571 (Pa. 1811).
14. See Gardner's Estate, 323 Pa. 229, 238, 185 Atl. 804, 808 (1936).
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By a strict application of this rule compensation should not be computed
as a percentage of the estate but should be awarded as a lump sum. This
has been done by several courts because they felt that such a method would
force an inquiry into the services rendered by the personal representative
and make the award more realistic.' 5 But generally the compensation
which is claimed and which is allowed is computed as a percentage of the
estate. By custom this early crystallized at 5%o of the personalty in the
estate.' 6 In the vast majority of estates this rate will be charged.
It is only in the administration of those estates conducted under other
than average circumstances that dispute has arisen and the 5% rate on
personalty been questioned. For example, it was suggested in Pusey v.
Clemson that if an estate was small and "collected in driblets," 5% would
be too small an amount to compensate the personal representative adequately. 17 But the cases show that the courts are very loath to allow over
57,1s unless the estate is exceptionally small.' 9. On the other hand, if the
estate is large, 5% will not usually be allowed.2 0 This is attributable to a
feeling that a large estate does not require substantially more work than a
small one so that proportionate increase of compensation results, in a large
estate, in a payment which is in excess of what is deserved. The general
tendency has been to limit the amount of compensation for the administration of estates over $100,000 to approximately 37.21 Although the fact
that the estate is over $100,000 raises what appears to be a presumption
against the allowance of greater compensation than 3%, it is by no means
final. For example, 5% was permitted in one such case where the administration of the estate was long and onerous but highly successful. 22

The

cases so holding, however, are extremely rare and all emphasize the extraordinary character of the services rendered.23 In fact the tendency to
15. Brook's Estate, 249 Pa. 66, 94 Atl. 478 (1915) ; Wister's Estate, 192 Pa. 289,

43 AtI. 1006 (1899). Cf. Harland's Account, 5 Rawle 323, 329 (Pa. 1835)
(guardian) : "It (compensation) may be awarded even in a gross sum, according to
a common practice in the country, which I take to be the preferable one as it necessarily leads to an examination of the nature, items, and actual extent of the services;
which the adoption of a rate per cent, has a tendency to leave out of view."
16. Pusey v. Clemson, 9 S. & R. 204, 209 (Pa. 1822).
17. Ibid.
18. Kennedy's Appeal, 4 Pa. 149 (1846) ; Barhite's Appeal, 126 Pa. 404, 17 Atl.

617 (1889).
19. Armstrong's Estate, 6 Watts 236 (1837). $200 commissions were allowed on
an estate of $1753.
20. Quigley's Estate, 329 Pa. 278, 198 AtI. 307 (1938) ; Gardner's Estate, 323 Pa.
229, 185 AtI. 804 (1936) ; Young's Estate, 204 Pa. 32, 53 Atl. 511 (1902) ; Sunderland's Estate, 203 Pa. 155, 52 AtI. 167 (1901).
21. Stewart's Appeal, 110 Pa. 410, 6 Atl. 321 (1885); Stevenson's Estate, 4

Wharton 97 (Pa. 1839).
22. Semple's Estate, 189 Pa. 385, 42 Atl. 28 (1899)

(It was shown that the

administration covered eight years and required much litigation, that the transactions

involved amounted to more than five times the amount on which commissions were
asked, and that the net result of the work was to increase an estate near financial ruin
to more than $300,000.).
23. Gillespie's Estate, 75 Pittsburgh 481 (1927).

It should be noted that if a large

percentage of the legatees or heirs consent to the higher rate, that is a strong factor
in favor of the allowance of the higher rate. Lilly's Estate, 181 Pa. 478, 37 Atl. 557
(1897).
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limit compensation to 3% in large estates has so crystallized that in some
cases the reas6n for it is forgotten, and compensation is limited to 3% even
though the auditing judge feels that the executor encountered sufficient
difficulty to entitle him to the usual rate of 5%.24 Such a result is unfortunate and unnecessary.
The reduced compensation allowed on larger estates in Pennsylvania
is in large measure consistent with statutory schemes of compensation in
many other states. In gefieral these statutes set a base compensation and
then allow smaller rates on the successive increments of the estate as the
size of the estate increases.2 5 But the Pennsylvania courts have expressly
rejected a scheme based on a graduated scale and the reduced rate of com26
pensation is applied to the value of the whole estate.
Factors Affecting Compenstion.-In attempting to break down the
factors that should be considered in determining what amount of compensation should be allowed the personal representative for his services,
there is a line of cases which has espoused the theory that a flat rate of
2Y2 % on the whole personal estate should be awarded for the responsibility
incurred by the personal representative.2 7 Additional compensation would
then be granted for the actual labor involved in the administration of the
estate in order to arrive at the final fee. Though responsibility is an important element, it is questionable whether it is proper to establish a flat
rate for this factor. 28 It is also debatable whether all courts would agree
that 2Y27%should always be the compensation awarded for the responsibility undertaken by an executor or administrator. But notwithstanding,
the courts seem to feel that a 2Y27%minimum should be fixed as compensation for the administration of personalty in an estate, and that the total
commissions should be limited to this minimum only when the estate is
unusually large.

29

24. Stevenson's Estate, 4 Wharton 97 (Pa. 1839).
25. For example CAL. PROB. CODE § 901 (Deering, 1944) provides that 7% be
allowed on the first $1000 of the estate, 4% on the next $9000, 3% on the next
$10,000, 2% on the next $30,000, and 1% on the remainder.
26. Gardner's Estate, 323 Pa. 229, 185 AtI. 804 (1936); Frick's Estate, 13 Pa.
D. & C. 536 (1930). But see the concurring opinion of Mr .Justice Bell in Williamson Estate, 368 Pa. 343, 356, 82 A.2d 49, 56 (1951), where it is suggested that such a
scheme of graduated compensation be adopted.
27. Sunderland's Estate, 203 Pa. 155, 52 Atl. 167 (1902); Stevenson's Estate, 4
Wharton 97 (Pa. 1839) ; Flick's Estate, 14 Luzerne 159 (1905).
28. To illustrate, Pusey v. Clemson, 9 S. & R. 204, 209 (Pa. 1822), said that as
there was less responsibility involved when the assets were sufficient to pay the debts
in that there was less danger of liability for misapplication of assets, the compensation
should be less than the usual rate. But, on the other hand in Harbster's Appeal, 125
Pa. 1, 17 Atl. 204 (1889), the increased responsibility resulting from the disposition
of the heirs to hold the accountants responsible for every error of judgment, led the
court to allow 4% commissions even though the estate was over $100,000 and the usual
rate would have been 3%.
29. See Flick's Estate, 14 Luzerne 159 (1905) where 2%/2% was allowed on an
estate close to $1,000,000. It does not seem that 2y% was allowed for responsibilities
here, as then nothing would have been awarded for the other services performed by
the administrator.
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Another important factor which has resulted in the reduction of the
personal representative's compensation has been the distribution of the
assets in kind without conversion into cash. In the cases in which the
question has generally arisen, securities made up the major part of the
estate, but the same principle has been applied to cash on deposit which
never underwent conversion 8 ° In such cases the commission allowed has
been reduced to approximately 3% 31 The courts reason that 5% should
not be allowed since the only responsibility of the personal representative
has been to keep the property intact and account for it.32 When there is
no litigation as to compensation, however, commissions are not usually
limited to 3% merely because distribution is in kind. Furthermore, in
several of the estates where commissions have been reduced because distribution was in kind, the securities distributed were valued at over $100,000
33
so that the size of the estate was undoubtedly a factor in the reduction.
But there have been small estates where the decrease in compensation has
been the same. 4 It might seem that the reduction in the percentage
decreed should be greater when both a large estate and distribution in
kind are involved, than when only one of these factors is present, but no
cases appear to have been so decided. Apparently the courts in effect
adopt the rule that the personal representative is entitled to approximately
2Y/27 merely for the responsibility he incurs, notwithstanding the size
of the estate or the method of distribution, though they do not always
35
say so.
While it has been repeatedly declared that the mere fact that assets
are not converted is no reason for complete disallowance of commissions,3 6
the contention has been advanced that no compensation should be awarded
for distribution of a specific legacy.37 Apparently compensation has never
been completely denied for this reason, but in Weisner's Estate38 a distinction was made between specific legacies and other assets distributed
in kind for the purpose of computing the amount of the personal representative's compensation. He was there allowed but 2Y2 % on the specific
30. Albright's Estate, 1 Pa. D. & C. 43 (1921).
31. Ellis' Estate, 254 Pa. 402, 98 Atl. 1083 (1916); Walker's Estate, 9 S. & R.
223 (Pa. 1823) ; Ficus' Estate, 13 Pa. Super. 615 (1900) ; In re Estate of O'Leary,
57 Pittsburgh 452 (1909).
Contra, Davis' Appeal, 100 Pa. 201 (1882). This
case emphasizes the fact that the appellate courts are loath to interfere with the action
of the auditing judge. A reduction was also refused in Harbster's Appeal, 125 Pa.
1, 17 Atl. 204 (1889), but there the dominant factor was the disposition of the heirs
to hold the accountants liable.
32. Albright's Estate, 1 Pa. D.&C. 43 (1921).
33. Kelley's Estate, 250 Pa. 172, 95 Atl. 400 (1915); Whelen's Appeal, 70 Pa.
410 (1872) ; Ott's Estate, 103 Pa. Super. 55, 158 Atl. 286 (1931).
34. See note 31 supra, particularly In re Estate of O'Leary where the whole
estate amounted to only $8775.
35. See Stevenson's Estate, 4 Wharton 98 (Pa. 1838).
36. See Gardner's Estate, 323 Pa. 229, 240, 185 AtI. 804, 809 (1936).
37. Ziegler's Appeals, 4 Atl. 837 (Pa. 1886) ; contra, McMenamin's Estate, 15
Phila. 510 (1881).
38. 30 Pa. Dist. 977 (1920).
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legacy, while 3%% was allowed on the remaining assets which were distributed in kind. Apparently the precedent relied on for these cases was
not a case involving an executor or administrator but one in which a
trustee was refused a commission on the principal of a trust, the res of
which was a specific investment.3 9 However, when a personal representative is involved and there is the duty and responsibility of collecting and
40
distributing the assets, there would seem to be no basis for this distinction.
REAL ESTATE

As to estates governed by the law prior to the Fiduciaries Act of 1949
the generally accepted doctrine is that the personal representative is entitled to compensation in regard to real estate only when he has effected
an authorized sale of real property in the estate.4 ' The usual rate of compensation is set at 22 % 42 or 3% 43 of the proceeds of the sale.

There

has been little tendency to reduce the compensation below this percentage
even when the proceeds of the sale are large. 44 But unlike the rates on
personal property, the rate allowed on the proceeds of sales of real estate
will be increased more readily above the customary 3% if unusual circumstances exist, although the maximum appears to be 5%. A greater commission has been awarded if the services of the personal representative
have been burdensome, 45 or if he has made the sale at an exceptionally
good price, or has made the sale himself so that no broker's fee has had
to be charged against the estate, 46 or if the proceeds of the sale are so
small that 3% would not be adequate compensation for his efforts in
selling the land. 47 It is unfortunate that some courts, though feeling that
there is no rational reason for allowing only 3% on the proceeds of a sale
39. McCauseland's Appeal, 38 Pa. 466 (1861). For a discussion of this problem
in Virginia where commissions are refused on a specific legacy see Note, 32 VA. L.
REv. 1205 (1946).
40. 2 WOERNER, op. cit. mpra note 6, at 1167.
41. See Harrison's Estate, 217 Pa. 207, 66 Atl. 354 (1907).
42. Gyger's Appeal, 74 Pa. 48 (1873) ; Baker's Estate, 47 Pa. D.&C. 444 (1942).
43. Snyder's Appeal, 54 Pa. 67 (1867) ; Lutz's Estate, 40 Pa. D.&C. 611 (1941).
44. But where the accountant was appointed in lieu of a deceased executor merely
to make the sale, he was allowed only 2%. Singerley's Estate, 10 Pa. Dist. 258
(1880). Of interest also in emphasizing the importance of responsibility is Wister's
Appeal, 125 Pa. 526, 17 Atl. 460 (1889), where a trustee who sold real estate, paying
the proceeds into court, was allowed only 1% commission on the proceeds. But it
should be noted also that the sum involved exceeded $200,000.
45. Robb's Appeal, 41 Pa. 45 (1861), where, added to the fact that the property
was some distance from the home of the administrator, prior claims to the realty had
to be settled, mortgages and judgments paid and applications made to several courts.
Award was 5%.
46. See Brolasky's Estate, 4 Pa. Dist. 218 (1881). A trustee was involved, but
the language of the court included executors. Award was 5%.
47. Kelly's Estate, 9 Pa. Dist. 387 (1900). The proceeds were but $2420 and
there were mortgages, taxes, judgments and municipal liens against the property.
Oliver's Estate, 13 Delaware Co. 240 (1915). Award was 5% in both cases. But
see Gallet's Estate, 19 Phila. 15 (1888), where all the above factors except size were
emphasized in order to justify 3%.
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of real estate when 5% is allowed on converted personalty, nevertheless
when faced with factual situations such as the above, have felt bound by
what they considered a rigid rule limiting compensation to 3%o of the proceeds from the sale of the real property. 48 Such reasoning is entirely contrary to the theory that compensation shall be an adequate payment for the
responsibility and labor incurred.
Though commissions were uniformly given to the executor or administrator when real property in the estate was legitimately sold by him, the
cases were in some confusion as to whether a commission might properly
be allowed when no sale took place. There were two situations prior to
the Fiduciaries Act of 1949 when this question might arise: first, when no
power of sale was given in the will, but for some reason, because of services
given in connection with the real property in the estate, the personal representative felt entitled to commissions thereon; second, when a power of sale
was given in the will, but was unexercised, either because it was discretionary or because the legatees elected to take in kind rather than to take
the proceeds of a sale. When no power over realty was given in the will,
it was argued that as title to the real property passed to the heir or devisee,
and as the only authority given the executor was that given in the will,
anything else he did in connection with the real estate was done outside
of the jurisdiction of the Orphans' Court and hence commissions for such
services could not be allowed against the estate by that court.49 Thus when
no power of sale was given in the will the courts were practically unanimous
in denying the executor or administrator compensation. Even though the
executor held conferences with the devisees and drew up deeds whereby
land left to the devisees was divided among them, the court held that it
had no jurisdiction to award the executor compensation from the estate."
The services were not rendered pursuant to the administration of the estate
but at the request of the parties among whom the land was divided and
from whom remuneration would have to be recovered in another action.
Effect of Unexercised Power of Sale.-Where a power of sale had
been given the executor, but no sale had taken place, there were cases in
which he received compensation for services that he performed, 51 but these
cases were rare and the actual practice was not to award compensation.
48. Sharp's Estate, 9 Pa. Dist. 727 (1881). But see Kelly's Estate, 9 Pa. Dist.
387 (1900).
49. Haly's Estate, 16 Pa. Super. 70 (1900); Bishop Estate, 63 Pa. D.&C. 298
(1948) ; Aberle Estate, 62 Montgomery 270 (1946); Carey Estate, 26 Erie 192
(1943) ; Lehman's Estate, 54 Dauphin 9 (1943); Harter's Estate, 18 Pa. Dist. 1026
(1909).
50. Stafford Estate, 24 Erie 189 (1942), affd, 152 Pa. Super. 551, 33 A.2d 78
(1943).
51. Twadell's Appeal, 813/ Pa. 221 (1875); Winsel's Estate, 19 Pa. Dist. 659
(1909) ; Donat's Estate, 3 Pa. Dist. 749 (1894); Mishkin's Estate, 47 Lancaster
389 (1941) ; Vogt's Estate, 9 Erie 135 (1927). But see Haly's Estate, 16 Pa. Super.
70 (1901), where compensation was denied on unconverted real estate although
there was apparently a right in the executors to sell. Cf. Price's Estate, 7 Montgomery 35 (1891), where no commissions were allowed on realty until sold or until
the heirs elected to take in kind.
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Such cases, however, are helpful in showing what factors should be considered in computing compensation when it is allowed on unconverted
realty. As has been seen, the commissions allowed on unconverted personal
property have in theory been lower than the commissions allowed when
the personalty has been sold. Thus it would be logical to assume that
when real estate is unconverted any commissions which are allowed would
be less than those allowed when real estate is sold. This has generally
been the result reached, although the justification for awarding such compensation has varied.
The leading case on the subject is Twadell's Appeal.52 Testator devised his land to trustees who were to pay out th income from the property. At the end of fifteen years from the testator's death his executor,
who was not the same person as the trustee named in the will, was given
a discretionary power to sell the land. Acting pursuant to this atthority
the executor started to make arrangements for a sale. However, the beneficiaries who would have taken the proceeds of a sale expressed a desire to
take the land instead. The executor deferred to their wishes and no sale
was made. Although there had been no sale, the executor claimed a commission of 3% of the value of the land at the time he could have sold it.
It was held that as a power of sale had been conferred on him, he was
accountable for the real estate to a certain extent and was therefore within
the jurisdiction of the Orphans' Court in regard to his services concerning
the realty. As a consequence he was granted compensation of 1% for the
work and responsibility incurred by him in determining whether or not
he should sell the property.
In other cases, even though it was apparently assumed that the power
of sale gave the court jurisdiction to award compensation, it was felt that
there had to be a sale to justify granting the commission. As a result a
fiction was used to give an executor compensation for his services where
he had effected a division of land among several devisees so that each held
a particular part of the land by himself, instead of all holding as tenants
in common. The court found that because of this change in the interests
of the devisees in the land, there was a "sale." 53 Although the transaction
was called a "sale" for the purpose of allowing a commission, it was not
treated as an ordinary sale for the purpose of computing the commission,
since only 1.4% was allowed. Other decisions have not been concerned
about whether or not there was a sale. They have been based squarely
on the fact that the personal representative should be adequately compensated for his labors. For example, although an executor died before he
was able to exercise a power of sale, his estate was awarded compensation of 1% on the lowest estimated value of the premises for his efforts
54
in attempting to make a sale.
52. 81Y Pa. 221 (1875).
53. Winsel's Estate, 19 Pa. Dist. 659 (1909).
54. Donat's Estate, 3 Pa. Dist. 749 (1894). But the importance of bringing the
transaction to a successful conclusion is illustrated by Vogt's Estate, 9 Erie 135
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The common factor in each of these cases was that because of unusual
circumstances the personal representative was called on to perform services
in connection with realty for which he deserved compensation. All these
cases are perhaps questionable since they rest on the ground that an executor's discretionary power of sale over the realty brings the property within
the jurisdiction of the court so that the executor can be compensated for
services regarding it. That difficulty is not present under the 1949 Fiduciaries Act which makes such services part of the personal representative's
duties. Therefore, the important factor to be gleaned from these cases
is that for services in connection with unconverted realty the courts have
in some instances awarded the personal representative commissions of between 1% and ,2% of the value of the property.
Trusts.-A trustee is not usually allowed a commission on the principal of unconverted real estate at the termination of the trust. The justification for this is that a commission on the income from the trust property
constitutes sufficient compensation for the care and responsibility required
in the management of the estate.5 5 But there are a group of cases where
commissions on the unconverted realty in a trust have been granted. It
has been suggested that these cases may aid in determining the proper
compensation to be awarded a personal representative for the administration of real estate.50 The ground upon which such compensation was
allowed was that the return from the income was not sufficient to compensate the trustee adequately. 57 In such cases the commissions from income were low compared to the value of the real property and the management of the lands proved onerous. For example, in Biddle's Appeal58
the land was constantly being improved because of the expansion of the
city. Streets were being opened through it and the property was subject
to various municipal liens. Only $209 per year was received as commissions on rent although the land was valued at $204,000. Additional
compensation of $2,000, about 1%, was allowed out of principal at the
termination of the trust, which had been in existence for nineteen years.5 9
(1927), in which the executor was allowed 232% although his labors were slight"An interview with the legatees was had, the election made, and the deed executed."
Id. at 139. But see Winsel's Estate, supra note 53, where in a similar transaction
less than 15 was awarded. Of interest is Mishkin's Estate, 47 Lancaster 389
(1941), where slightly less than 27o was given the administrator for the successful
management of apartment houses for a year and a half. Though the court emphasized
the successful management of the property, that very fact tended to keep the rate
allowed on the value of the property low since, as the court was very conscious, the
executor was also getting 59 of the income from the property.
55. See the opinion of the lower court in Biddle's Appeal, 83 Pa. 340 (1877);
McGuffey's Estate, 123 Pa. Super. 432, 187 Atl. 298 (1936).
56. Boyle, The Administration of Real Estate Under the FiduciariesAct of 1949,
PrrrSBURGH L.J., Dec. 23, 1950, pp. 6-7. These cases are part of a group, others
of which have already been discussed in this note.
57. See Biddle's Appeal, 83 Pa. 340, 345 (1877).
58. Ibid.
59. See also Schwartz's Estate, 93 Pittsburgh 271 (1945) which followed Biddle's Appeal, supra note 57. Apparently 19 on the total realty, both converted and
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Although the courts have said many times that the compensation of a
trustee is not necessarily the same as that of an executor,60 both fiduciaries
are responsible for the care and management of real property. As a consequence there must be some relationship between the compensation received
by each. But, in general, property in a trust estate is productive, as the
purpose of such an estate usually is to supply the beneficiary with income.
Thus a percentage of income may provide the trustee with a reasonable
compensation. And even if the income is small a percentage of it, combined with a small percentage of the principal such as that awarded in
Biddle's Estate, will prove to be a sufficient remuneration. But in a
decedent's estate it may well be that the real estate will be non-productive.
Also, in the extended period of a trust as compared with the shorter period of administration, there should ordinarily be more income from which
there can be compensation for the services involved. These factors show
that the small rate of compensation allowed on unconverted real estate in a
trust is determined on a basis distinguishable from that which should govern the personal representative's compensation on unconverted real property in a decedent's estate.
Statutes in Other States.-There are a number of states in which the
personal representative takes possession of and administers both the real
and personal property of the decedent. In many of these states the rate
of compensation of executors and administrators is expressly set by statute. 61
Such statutes are of three types in their treatment of real property. The
majority provide for the same rate of compensation on both real and personal property. 62 A smaller group provide for the same compensation on
the proceeds of sales of realty as of personalty, but make separate provisions for unconverted real estate, either not providing for compensation

63

64

That some states make no
or leaving it to the discretion of the court.
provision for compensation to the personal representative in respect to
unconverted real estate can perhaps be explained by the fact that the
unconverted was allowed. But the compensation was also 5% of the proceeds of the
converted realty. The trust extended through the period of the depression so that income was low; there were delinquent tax problems, mortgages, defaulting tenants
and the property was old and difficult to keep in repair. The trustees also had a
power of sale. See Dougherty's Appeal, 6 Sadler 69, 73 (Pa. 1887).

60. Ibid.
61. 81 TRuSTS AND ESTATES 491 (1945) provides an analysis of various schemes
for compensating personal representatives.
62. ARiz. CODE ANN. § 38-1404 (1940) ; CALIF. PROBATE CODE § 901 (Deering,
1944); FLA. STAT. § 734.01 (1949) ; GA. CODE §§ 113-2001 to 113-2004 (1933), as
amended, Ga. Laws of 1941, p. 299; IDAHO CODE § 15-1107 (1948) ; MONT. REV.
CODE ANN. § 91-3407 (Choate, 1947); N.Y. SuRR. CT. AcT. § 285 (Cahill-Parsons,
New York Civil Practice 1946) ; N.D. REv. CODE § 30-2004 (1943) ; OxiA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 58, § 527 (1937); ORE. ComP. LAWS ANN. § 19-1011 (1940); T~x. REV.
Civ. CODE ANN. §§ 3689, 3690 (Vernon, 1939) ; UTAH CODE ANN., § 102-11-25 (1943);
Wyo. ComP. STAT. ANN. § 6-2007 (1945).
63. NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-1412 (1948); Wis. STAT. § 317.08 (1947).
64. MIcH. Comp. LAWS § 704.33 (1948) ; S.D. CODE § 35.1603 (1939), as amended,
S.D. Session Laws of 1947, p. 208.
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statutes giving him the right to possess the real property have been interpreted to place no duty on him to take possession. In fact in states placing this interpretation on the statute, the executor or administrator is permitted to take possession of the real estate only when the administration of
the estate makes it necessary to do so, as for example to pay debts. 65 The
third type of statute is found only in Colorado and Nevada. The statutes
of these states apply one set of principles to compute the commission on
personal property and another set to compute the commission on real property. In Colorado a 3% maximum, which is the lowest rate on personal
property, is awarded out of money received from the sale, mortgage, or letting of real estate.66 In Nevada, though definite rates are set for personalty,
commissions on real estate are left to the discretion of the court. 67 Hence,
although there is a view which would limit commissions on real estate to a
smaller sum than that on personalty, the large majority of these statutes
allow the executor or administrator the same commission on real estate as
he receives on personal property. Furthermore, in many other states where
the personal representative does not ordinarily take possession of real property except to sell it in order to pay debts, statutes provide that he is to
receive the same commission on the proceeds of such a sale as he would
receive on personalty. 68
COMPENSATION FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF REAL ESTATE
UNDER THE FIDUCIARIES

ACT OF 1949

The 1949 Act raised no problems regarding commissions on personalty
as the duties of the personal representative in regard to such property remained substantially unchanged. But the same is not true of real estate as
many additional duties and responsibilities were placed on executors and
administrators in respect to the administration of real estate.
The question of what would be a proper commission for the administration of real estate actually consists of several separate questions. First,
should any compensation be allowed on unconverted real estate? Second,
if compensation is to be allowed on unconverted real estate what should
it be? Because of the categories into which real estate is divided by the
Act, this question must be answered with respect to (1) real estate specifically devised, (2) real estate occupied by an heir or devisee, and (3)
real estate which is neither specifically devised nor occupied by an heir
or devisee. Third, does the Act require that greater compensation be
allowed on the proceeds from the sale of real estate than has hitherto
been permitted?
65. See J. H. Melville Lumber Co. v. Maroney, 145 Neb. 374, 381, 16 N.W.2d

527, 530 (1944); Note, Statutory Power of Executors and Administrators Over a
Decedent's Real Estate, 21 IowA L. REv. 793 (1936).
66. CoLO. STAT. ANN. c. 176, § 232 (1949).
68. IowA CODE § 638.23 (1950); MISS. CODE ANN. § 642 (1942) ; Mo. REv. STAT.
§ 465.100 (1949) ; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3:11-2.2 (Supp. 1950) ; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28-170
(1950) ; OHio GEN. CODE ANN. § 10509-192 (Page, Supp. 1950).
67. Nav. ComP. LAws § 9882.207 (Supp. 1942).
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By the terms of the Fiduciaries Act of 1949 all of the real and personal estate of a decedent, except real estate outside the Commonwealth,
is to be included in the inventory.6 9 It is provided that the personal representative "shall take possession of, maintain and administer all the real and
personal estate of the decedent, except real estate occupied by an heir or
devisee." He is to collect the rents and income from the property so possessed and make expenditures necessary to preserve the property. 70 A
power to sell all the real estate of the decedent is given, including that
occupied by an heir or devisee, unless the property has been specifically
devised. 71 To sell specifically devised property a court order would still be
necessary. In the light of the responsibility imposed on the personal representative by the Act, it would be hard to deny that he should receive compensation for the administration of real estate not occupied by an heir or
devisee which it is his duty to possess. For he must see that the property
is appraised, that taxes on it are paid, and that it is kept in repair. If
the property is productive, its management must be assumed by the personal representative. He must obtain public liability insurance and fire
insurance, and if policies have already been issued, he must be sure that
the coverage is great enough. If the property is used to serve the public,
the executor or administrator must see that existing laws for the protection
of the public are followed, with the possibility that he will be criminally
liable if they are not. Finally, in some cases he will have to exercise his
discretion as to whether the property should be sold.
Where property does not come into the possession of the personal representative because it is occupied by the heir or devisee, it is perhaps more
difficult to justify compensation for the personal representative. But even
in such a case, the property is to be included in the inventory so that it
must be appraised, and the personal representative will have duties relative
to the property in regard to the estate and inheritance taxes. 72 Therefore
it seems that he should be compensated for the administration of such property though perhaps at a lower rate than when he takes possession of the
property. The cases that have arisen concerning compensation of executors and administrators since the passage of the new Fiduciaries Act have
73
apparently conceded this proposition.
Relation of the Rates on the Categories Under the Act.-Assuming
that some compensation is to be allowed for the administration of uncon69. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 320.401 (Purdon, 1950).
70. Id, § 320.501.
71. Id, § 320.541.
72. Id, § 844.
73. See Anderson Estate, 1 Fiduc. Rep. 449, 461 (1951). And in Gaumer's Estate, 23 Lehigh 340 (1949), the court justified compensation to the personal representative on unconverted real estate because of the fact that he had taken care of the
taxes. However, as this case did not come under the Fiduciaries Act of 1949 it
would seem that the personal representative should have received no commissions
on this property.
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verted realty when it is in the possession of the personal representative and
also when it is occupied by an heir or devisee, the next question is whether
the same or different rates should be allowed for the different categories
of property. It has already been suggested that the personal representative's duties and responsibilities are much less onerous in the administration of property occupied by an heir or devisee, for he has none of the
responsibilities of possession in regard to such land. It would follow that
the lowest rate of compensation should be on this category of property.
In respect to commissions on unconverted real estate of which the
personal representative does take possession, it has been shown that there
is precedent for allowing less compensation on unconverted personal property than on personalty which is sold. 74 Although such a distinction may
not be followed in practice, the cases have pointed out that less is required
of the personal representative when property is distributed in kind, in the
average estate, than when a sale is made. It would thus appear logical
to apply this theory to real estate and to award a smaller commission for
the administration of unconverted real estate than would be awarded if
the property were sold.
The argument may perhaps be made that a lower rate should be set
for property specifically devised, but not occupied by an heir or devisee,
than is set for other unconverted real estate not occupied by an heir or
devisee. Such a practice was announced shortly after the passage of the
1949 Act by the Register of Wills in Philadelphia in respect to deductions
to be allowed for inheritance tax purposes. There was to be no deduction
for commissions where real estate was specifically devised and unsold.
Deductions were to be allowed for commissions of 2%o on real estate not
specifically devised, but unsold, and 3%o on converted real estate or real
estate ordered to be converted by will.75 The idea that no compensation
should be allowed on real estate which is specifically devised, but which
the personal representative takes possession of, was repudiated in Anderson Estate 76 in which a commission of 1% was allowed on such property.
But it was implied in that decision that less compensation should be allowed
on real estate specifically devised, but unoccupied by an heir or devisee
than on real estate not specifically devised and unoccupied by an heir or
devisee. However, as the principal burden on the personal representative
in regard to unconverted real estate is the responsibility of possession,
which is the same whether the property be specifically devised or not,
such a distinction should not be made. As has been noted, except for one
isolated case that was never followed, 77 the same commissions have been
allowed on unconverted personal property whether specifically bequeathed
or not.
74. See notes 31 and 51-54 supra.

75. See Anderson Estate, 1 Fiduc. Rep. 449, 457 (1951).
76. Ibid.
77. Weisner's Estate, 30 Pa. Dist. 977 (1920).
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To summarize, it would seem that the largest commissions, should be
awarded on the proceeds from sales of real estate, a smaller, commission
on unconverted real estate not occupied by an heir or devisee, and the
smallest commission on real estate occupied by an heir or devisee, making
no distinction in any case in regard to property specifically devised.
Amount.-After determining the proportions which the commissions
on the different categories of real estate should bear to each other, the
final problem is to determine the size of the commissions. There are two
conflicting views. The first possibility would be to allow the same commissions on real estate as have previously been allowed on personalty.
A second possibility would be to apply the same principles to the computation of commissions on real estate as are used in regard to personalty,
but to set a lower scale of rates. Three percent would remain as the usual
commission on the proceeds from a sale of real estate and the commissions
on unconverted realty would be comparably lower.
It has been contended that the scheme of compensation which, on the
face of the Act seems most logical, is to consider real estate and personal
property the same for the purpose of compensating the personal representative. 78 The basis of this position is that in imposing the duty on the
personal representative to inventory, 79 take possession of,8 0 and distribute
a decedent's real and personal property,8 ' the Act treats both types of
property together, with the exception of realty occupied by an heir or
devisee. Under this view the mere fact that title to the real estate is in
the heir or devisee,8 2 while title to the personalty is in the executor or
administrator, s would have no effect on the compensation he receives. Nor
would any limitations on the right of the personal representative to sell
real estate have any bearing on his compensation. For he is being compensated for his work in distributing the property and the responsibility
of possessing it, and neither of these is affected by the location of title
or the right to sell. It is worthy of note that in the majority of states
where statutory rates are set and the personal representative takes possession of both real and personal property, the compensation on each type
8 4
of property is the same.
Under such a scheme 5% would be allowed on the proceeds of real
estate sales, 3% on unconverted property not occupied by an heir or devisee,
78. See Shafer Estate, 1 Fiduc. Rep. 321, 325 (1951). The court intimates that
the same compensation should be allowed on personalty and realty. Actually the accountant had taken a credit for 8% commissions on the gross estate which was practically all real estate. The Commonwealth objected to allowing this much as a tax
deduction, but the court held that as there had been no exceptions to the account, and
such commissions had not been shown to be unreasonable the full 8% could be deducted. See FiDUCIARY REVIEW, June 1951 p. 3.
79. PA. STAT. Axw. tit. 20, § 320.401 (Purdon, 1950).
80. Id., § 320.501.
81. Id., §§ 320.734, 320.736.
82. Id., § 320.104.
83. Id., § 320.103.
84. See note 62 supra.
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and a nominal sum of perhaps 1% on property occupied by an heir or
devisee.8 5 Of course, if the heir or devisee took possession soon after the
decedent's death under § 735 or otherwise, some downward adjustment
in the executor's or administrator's compensation would have to be made,
for his labors arising from possession would then be considerably lessened.
Support for this position can be gained from those cases which put forth
the view that 22% should be allowed for the responsibility involved in
the possession of personalty with added sums for other services.8 6 Though
it has been shown that it is illogical to say that 231 % should be an unvarying figure to compensate for responsibility, it may be accepted as an
average. This figure is in line with a commission of 3% on unconverted
realty.
But it is unlikely that the courts will be willing to allow the same
commissions on real estate as are allowed on personal property, in the light
of the traditional 3% rate on the proceeds from sales of real estate, 7
even though the reason for allowing only 3% commissions on the proceeds
of a sale of realty has always been obscure, and some courts have gone
so far as to say there was no reason for it.88 Perhaps it arose because
the personal representative did not have the responsibilities of possession
prior to the time it became necessary to sell realty to pay the decedent's
debts.8 9 But this reason is not particularly satisfactory when it is considered that he still had to take possession of and distribute the proceeds
of such a sale, the same as he would other cash which was originally in
the estate and on which he would receive 5% commissions. Today with
the higher cost of living it might well be argued that there is still less
justification for the distinction. For what may have been an adequate compensation when the rule evolved may no longer be so. 9°
Notwithstanding, the courts appear to be reluctant to increase the
compensation awarded to a fiduciary over that which has been customarily
awarded.9 1 It seems unlikely, therefore, that they will depart from the
award of a commission of 3% on the proceeds of realty, and the comparably
lower rates on unsold real estate, even though such a departure might be
85. See Gaumer's Estate, 23 Lehigh 340 (1949).

Award was 1Y29% on a specific

devise, for services in regard to estate and inheritance taxes. These were the only
services since the administration began prior to the Fiduciaries Act of 1949.
86. See note 27 supra.
87. See note 43 supra.
88. Sharp's Estate, 9 Pa. Dist. 727, 728 (1900). See Lutz's Estate, 40 Pa.
D.&C. 611 (1941).
89. See 2 WoERNEa, op. cil. supra note 4, at 1147.
90. See the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Bell in Williamson Estate, 368 Pa.
343, 357, 82 A.2d 49, 56 (1951), in which he suggests that the 3% ceiling on commissions in large estates be removed "because of the tremendous increases in the cost
and expenses of everything" which makes what was a just compensation years ago
inadequate today.
91. For example, in Williamson Estate, 368 Pa. 343, 82 A.2d 49 (1951) the court
refused to allow a trustee commissions from the principal of a trust prior to the termination of the trust.
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justified on some grounds. For instance in Anderson Estate, only 1%
was allowed on specifically devised realty which was unconverted. The
court apparently approved a scheme of compensation worked out by the
Register of Wills in Philadelphia for tax deduction purposes which would
92
allow less compensation on realty than on personalty. . Aside from
the traditional 3% rate on the proceeds of realty, additional support for
this position is gained from those precedents in which trustees, executors,
and administrators have been allowed only small commissions of approximately 14% on unconverted real estate.93 Both of these groups of
cases tend to bear out the contention that the rates on real estate, whether
it is sold or unconverted, should be scaled at a lower figure than those
on personalty. But it has been pointed out that it is expected that a
trustee will be adequately compensated out of income from the property
for its management. Also, in the majority of those cases involving executors and administrators, the devisees were in possession so that none
of the responsibilities of possessing the property were on the personal representative. 94
Aside from the legal precedents, there are two practical factors which
justifiably carry great weight in influencing the courts to adopt a scheme
of compensation based on a 3% commission on proceeds of real estate
sales, with a lower rate on unconverted realty, and which make the adoption of such a scheme likely. When a sale of real estate takes place it
will in all probability be made by a real estate broker and not by the administrator or executor. The broker's fee, which is customarily 57o
of the proceeds, will be charged against the estate. The addition of a
commission for the executor, makes a sizeable charge against the estate
for the administration of one piece of property. In their desire to keep
the estate intact the courts will be reluctant to allow the personal representative anything more than he is now getting on a sale. The importance of this element is emphasized by a recent adjudication in the
Orphans' Court of Philadelphia, in which a corporate executor was permitted a commission of 5% on the proceeds of a sale of realty when it
effected the sale itself without benefit of a real estate broker. 95 Though
unusual services were spoken of, the emphasis was on the fact that the
sale had been made directly by the executor. The second factor is that
the personal representative's commissions on real estate which is specifically
devised will probably not be charged against the real estate in question, but
will be charged against the residue, as is the case when a specific bequest
of personal property is made.96 Here again the courts will tend to keep
92. 1 Fiduc. Rep. 449, 457 (1951).
93. See notes 52, 57 and 59 supra.
94. Twadell's Appeal, 81y2Pa. 221 (1875).
95. Estate of John A. Mayer, No. 3287-1950, O.C., Phila.
96. Anderson Estate, 1 Fiduc. Rep. 449 (1951). But in Hoskin's Estate, No.
309-1951, O.C., Phila., an opposite result was reached and the commissions were
charged to the devisee. See FmcUxCMY REvIEw, September 1951, p. 1.
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the charge low so as not to increase the burden already placed on the
residuary estate. As a result it is probable that 3% will continue to be
allowed on sales of real estate, and that approximately 2% will be
allowed on unconverted real estate not occupied by an heir or devisee,
and 1% on unconverted real estate occupied by an heir or devisee.
CONCLUSION

Although there may be no reason why the same commissions should
not be allowed on realty as are allowed on personalty when the services
and responsibilities involved are considered, the result the courts are apparently reaching by allowing lower rates on realty may well be justified.
For in a great many instances prior to the 1949 Act the personal representative performed many duties with respect to real estate that he was
not legally obligated to perform. While no commission based on realty
was allowed in such cases, the fact that such services were rendered was
undoubtedly a factor when the personal representative received the customary commission of 5%o on the personalty. Today, of course, the obligation to perform such duties with respect to real estate is imposed on
the personal representative and the courts are therefore authorized to award
him commissions on real estate. But the reluctance to award the same
commission on realty that is awarded on personalty could be due to the
realization that whatever commissions the personal representative receives
on personalty at the 5% rate to some extent reflect comipensation for his
services in connection with the realty. Some additional compensation is
justified because of the increased responsibility, and this has been recognized
by the courts but not to the extent of giving the same rate on the personalty as is given on the realty.97 The result is that the commission
awarded on the estate as a whole, both realty and personalty, is less than
That a rate lower than 5% on many of the larger estates which are
nonetheless smaller than $100,000 is a fair compensation is suggested by
the statutory rates which have been established in many states. While
these statutes generally give more than 5%o on the very small estates, the
commission allowed on the portion of the estate over approximately $20,000
is usually at a lower rate than 5%, averaging 2% or 3% and in some
states even lower.98 Though the lower rate in such states is not on the
97. Ibid.
98. For example CAL. PROB. CODE § 901 (Deering, 1944) provides that the personal representative shall receive commissions of 7% on the first $1000, 4% on the
next $9000, 3% on the next $10,000, 2% on the next $30,000, and 1% on the portion
of the estate over $50,000. Although the rates may be slightly different the following
statutes are to the same effect: FLA. STAT. § 734.01 (1949) ; IDAHO CoDE § 15-1107
(1948); IOWA CODE § 638.23 (1950); MIcH. Comtp. LAws

§

704.33 (1948); MONT.

REV. CODE § 91-3407 (Choate, 1947) ; Na. REv. STAT. § 30-1412 (1948) ; N-v. CoM-P.
LAws § 9882.207 (Supp. 1942); N.Y. SuRR. CT. AcT § 285 (Cahill-Parsons, New
York Civil Practice 1946) ; N.D. Rev. Code § 30-2004 (1943) ; OHio GEaN. CODE Aw-r.
§ 10509-192 (Page, Supp. 1950); OYLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 58, § 527 (1937); Omz.
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whole estate, the total commissions on an estate approximating $100,000
are less than 5%o.
Rather than compensate for the administration of personalty at a rate
that is possibly excessive, and for the administration of realty at a lower
rate so that the total compensation awarded for the administration of the
estate will be fair, it might perhaps be better to reevaluate commissions as
a whole and arrive at a figure that could be applied to both realty and
personalty. That such a change would have to be legislative is obvious;
the courts would be unwilling to make such a departure. 99 In view of
the changes made in decedents' estates law by the Act of 1949 which,
as has been seen, raises many perplexing questions as to the compensation
to be awarded a personal representative for the administration of real
estate, the present time would be an excellent one for any reexamination of
commissions which are based on customary rates established as long ago
as 1820.
Seth W. Watson, Jr.

CONTRIBUTION, INDEMNITY, IMPLEADER AND JOINDER
UNDER THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT
The doctrine that demands a strict interpretation of immunity-waiving
statutes I was materially weakened, so far as the Federal Tort Claims
Act 2 is concerned, by the Supreme Court decision last year in United
States v. Yellow Cab Company, Capital Transit Company v. United
States.8 The Court resolved a conflict between two circuit courts by
holding that an action for contribution may be maintained against the
United States under the Act, and that the United States may be impleaded
for purposes of contribution in accordance with Rule 14(a) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. 4 As a result of this decision and the Court's
recent holding that subrogees may sue under the Act, 5 the federal courts
are apparently committed to a policy of treating the United States in tort
ComP. LAWS ANN. § 19-1011 (1940); S.D. CoDE §35.1603 (1939), as amended, Session Laws of 1947, p. 208; UTAH CODE ANN. § 102-11-25 (1943) ; Wyo. Comp. STAT.
ANN. § 6-2007 (1945).

99. See Williamson Estate, 368 Pa. 343, 82 A.2d 49 (1951).
1. United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584 (1941) ; United States v. Shaw, 309
U.S. 495 (1940).
2. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 1402(b), 1504, 2110, 2401(b), 2402, 2411(b), 2412(c),
2671-2680 (Supp. 1951). Hereinafter referred to as the Act.
3.340 U.S. 543 (1951).
4. Capital Transit Co. v. United States, 183 F.2d 825 (D.C. Cir. 1950), and
Howey v. Yellow Cab Co., 181 F.2d 967 (3d Cir. 1950).
5. United States v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 338 U.S. 366 (1949). In both
cases the Court quoted judge Cardozo's statement in Anderson v. Hoyer Construction
Co., 243 N.Y. 140, 147, 153 N.E. 28, 29-30 (1926) : "The exemption of the sovereign
from suit involves hardship enough, where consent has been withheld. We are not
to add to its vigor by refinement of construction, where consent has been announced."

NOTES

actions as a private individual-a far cry from the ancient doctrine that
"the King can do no wrong." 6
The purpose of this note is to evaluate the effect of this decision on
future litigation under the Act in terms of the adequacy of existing law
to resolve the problems which might arise. Attention will be given to two
questions, closely related to those answered by the Court; whether an
action for indemnity can be maintained against the United States under
the Act and whether the United States can be joined as a co-defendant
under Rule 20(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.7
CONTRIBUTION AND INDEMNITY

Contribution and indemnity are substantially different remedies. If
contribution is allowed, a joint tortfeasor who has been compelled to discharge the whole obligation to an injured person will recover a ratable
portion of such total amount from the other tort-feasors, the idea being
one of equalization of what should be a common burden.8 If indemnity
is allowed, the one discharging the tort obligation will recover the whole
amount from the other, on the theory that, as between them, the primary
liability was on the one against whom indemnity is given.9 But for purposes of suit under the Act on either theory the problems presented are
the same; no court has distinguished one from the other; 10 and they are
therefore treated together here even though the Supreme Court did not
pass on the indemnity situation. The close analogy between contribution
and indemnity for purposes of suit under the Act would practically necessitate a similar decision should the question of indemnity come before the
Court." But although the Court has found that the United States con6. Sovereign immunity to suit has been successively whittled away by the following
Acts which preceded the Tort Claims Act: Court of Claims Act of Feb. 24, 1855, 28
U.S.C. § 1491 (Supp. 1951); Tucker Act of March 3, 1887, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)
(Supp. 1951) ; Patent Infringement Act of June 25, 1910, 36 STAT. 851 (1910), as
amended, 35 U.S.C. § 68 (1946) ; Suits in Admiralty Act of March 9, 1920, 41 STAT.
525 (1920) as amended, 46 U.S.C. § 741 et seq. (1946) ; Small Tort Claims Act of
Dec. 28, 1922, 28 U.S.C. § 2672 (Supp. 1951); Public Vessels Act of March 3, 1925,
43 STAT. 1112 (1925), as amended, 46 U.S.C. §781 et seq. (1946).
The Act specifically equates the government's liability with that of a private
individual by saying that the United States will be liable "if a private person would
be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or
omission. occurred." 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (Supp. 1951).
7. FED. R. Civ. P. 20(a).
8. Leflar, Contribution and Indemnity Between Torifeasors, 81 U. oF PA. L. Rzv.
130 (1932).
9. Id. at 131.
10. But compare Niagara Fire Insurance Co. v. United States, 76 F. Supp. 850,
855 (S.D. N.Y. 1948) with Newsum v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 79 F. Supp. 225
(S.D. N.Y. 1948).
11. Comparison also might be made with the exemptions under the Act to support this conclusion. 28 U.S.C. §2680 (Supp. 1951). The exemptions in this section
refer to certain types of governmental activity which Congress thought should be free
from the threat of damage suits, such as transmission of letters or postal matters,
assessment or collection of taxes or custom duties, establishment of quarantines, etc.;
or they relate to government activities for which adequate remedies are already available under other acts. SEN. REP. No. 1400, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946). For an
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sented to be sued for contribution, Congress has not provided adequate
means for carrying out this consent.
Determinatonof the Liability of the United States by a Jury Verdict.In a suit by a private individual against the United States for contribution
or indemnity, judgment for the individual would involve an award of
damages completely dependent upon the award granted by a trier of facts
other than the judge before whom this claim is litigated. If that trier
was a jury, then, in effect, the extent of the liability of the United States
would be fixed by a jury verdict.12 This seems inconsistent with the section of the Act which provides for actions against the United States to be
tried by the court without a jury.' 3 To illustrate: P is injured in an accident involving negligence by D and a United States employee. P sues D
and recovers $5,000 under a jury verdict. D sues the United States for
contribution under the Act. The court decides whether or not the United
States is liable, but if it determines that the United States is jointly liable,
it is bound to award one-half the damages or $2,500 to D.14 If D had sued
the United States for indemnity and the court found the United States to be
primarily liable, it would have to award $5,000 or full reimbursement to D.'1
Assuming that one of the main reasons for providing that claims
should be tried by the court is to protect the United States from the irrational awards of a jury sympathetic to the plaintiff, this argument against
allowing contribution and/or indemnity from the United States is meaningful. Of course, in the above hypothetical situation there is the mitigating factor that the jury did not have the United States treasury in mind
when it awarded the damages. But in view of the fact that the Supreme
Court has sanctioned the use of the impleader procedure in suits under the
Act it will rarely be possible in the future to hide the possibility that the
government might have to pay part of the verdict. This is so since in
most cases the individual defendant will implead the United States as a
third-party defendant in the suit brought by the injured plaintiff.
Legislative amendment, which would give the district courts the power
to review prior damage awards and allow contribution or indemnity according to their own determination of the damages, would be the proper
extended discussion of these exemptions see Gottlieb, The Federal Tort Claims ActA Statutory Interpretation, 35 GEo. L.J. 1, 40 (1946). Claims for contribution and
indemnity are certainly not includible within the two criteria, mentioned in the Senate
Report, for determining exceptions to suit under the Act. These actions have no
relation to any particular governmental activities, nor is there any other Act under
which they can be brought.
12. U.S. CONST. AmEND. VII provides that private litigants are entitled to a jury
trial as of right.
13. 28 U.S.C. § 2402 (Supp. 1951).
14. 13 Am. JuR. 22 (1940) ; RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION § 85 (1937).
15. 27 Am. JuR. 473 (1940). The third-party complaint filed against the United
States in Howey v. Yellow Cab Co., 181 F.2d 967 (3d Cir. 1950), claimed that "the
third-party defendant (U.S.) is or may be liable to the defendant for all or part of the
plaintiff's claim." Then it sought indemnity or contribution alternatively. [Brief for
Appellant, pp. 8a-9a.]
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solution to this problem. Such an amendment would not violate any
vested right of the individual who seeks contribution or indemnity from
the United States. Since the Government has the power to immunize
itself from suit entirely, it can waive that immunity on its own terms. 16
Statute of Limitations.-The Act provides that "A tort claim against
the United States shall be forever barred unless action is begun thereon
within two years after such claim accrues . . ." 17 A claim for contribution or indemnity does not accrue until the defendant (plaintiff in the
action for contribution or indemnity) has judgment entered against him
or has paid the judgment.' 8 The plain meaning of the Act then would
allow a claim for contribution or indemnity up to two years after the judgment has been entered or paid by the person who now seeks reimbursement from the Government. Thus, the following situation might occur:
In 1951 P, a citizen of Pennsylvania, is injured in a collision between a
vehicle driven by D, a citizen of Pennsylvania, and a United States mail
truck. P sues D in 1953 within the time required by the applicable statute
of limitations in Pennsylvania,' 9 and recovers a judgment in 1955 which
D pays immediately. Should D decide to sue the United States for contribution under the Act, he would probably have until 1957 to file his
daim.20
Such a state of affairs would involve the government in litigation over
an accident which occurred six years earlier and is distinctly abhorrent
to the need for speedy investigation of claims under the Act which prompted
Congress to provide for a short statute of limitations. 21 Probably the
courts could alleviate this predicament by following the reasoning adopted
in Terminal R. Association of St. Louis v. United States.2 2 There it was
held that a claim for indemnity against the United States, arising in 1948,
could not be maintained since the accident which led to the claim arose in
1943, before the Act became effective.23 The court reasoned that since
indemnity comes within the purview of the Act only because it is a claim
on account of injury to person or property, it cannot logically be held to
16. See United States v. Clyde-Mallory Lines, 127 F.2d 569, 571 (1942).
17. 28 U.S.C. §2401(b) (Supp. 1951).
18. Adam v. Vacquier, 48 F. Supp. 275 (W.D. Pa. 1942) ; Murray v. Pittsburgh
Athletic Company, 324 Pa. 486, 188 Atl. 190 (1936).
19. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 34 (Purdon 1931).
20. With the use of the impleading procedure this situation is not likely to occur
because ordinarily the defendant files his third-party complaint for contribution or
indemnity as soon as he is served with the plaintiff's complaint. But in a state where
the tort statute of limitations is longer than two years a similar difficulty could arise
if defendant is sued after two years and then seeks to implead the United States as a
third-party defendant.
21. Gellhorn and Schenck, Tort Actions Against the Federal Government, 47

COL. L. Rxv. 722, 733-4 (1947).

22. 182 F.2d 149 (8th Cir. 1950) ; Cf. Oahu Ry. and Land Co. v. United States,
73 F. Supp. 707 (D. Hawaii 1947).
23. The Act only covers claims "accruing on and after January 1, 1945 . .

28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (Supp. 1951).
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have arisen above its source.24 Therefore, since a direct claim for damages
could not have been brought before the effective date of the Act, the
derivative claim based on those damages cannot be maintained. This
process of reasoning could lead to the result that wherever a direct claim
for damages is barred by the statute of limitations, a derivative claim for
contribution or indemnity, based on those damages, should be likewise
barred.
Such a result would not only distort the language of the Act but would
very likely be unfair to the plaintiff in the suit for contribution or indemnity who might not have been sued by the original plaintiff in time to
bring his derivative suit within two years of the date on which the tort
occurred. Some compromise between the government's interest in the
speedy investigation of claims and the derivative plaintiff's interest in
having enough time to have his claim for contribution or indemnity adjudicated is thus in order. The following legislative amendment is offered
as a possible solution: "A claim for contribution or indemnity under this
Act must be brought within six months of the time when such claim
accrues or within two years of the time when the injury to person or
property that gave rise to the claim occurs, whichever period is longer."
'Suits by the United States for Contribution.-In deciding that the
United States has consented to be sued for contribution, Justice Burton,
for the Court, was clearly influenced by his assumption that the United
States could obtain contribution from joint tort-feasors if it had to pay the
judgment. He said,
"Of course there is no immunity from suit by the government to
collect claims for contribution due it from its joint tort-feasors.
It is fair that this should work both ways." 25
Unfortunately the assumption which led the Justice to a seemingly
fair result is questionable. In view of the Supreme Court's decision in
United States v. Standard Oil of California,26 it is certainly not a matter
"of course" that the United States can recover in an action for contribution or indemnity. In that case a United States soldier, who was injured
by a Standard Oil truck, was treated for weeks in an army hospital and
received full wages during his disability. The Government sued Standard
Oil for medical expenses and the loss of the soldier's services. The Court
denied recovery. It held that "federal common law" and not state law was
applicable because of the federal character of the relationship between a
government and its soldiers, the concern of the federal purse, and the need
24. See Terminal R. Association v. United States, 182 F.2d 149, 151 (8th Cir.
1950).
25. United States v. Yellow Cab Co., Capital Transit Co. v. United States, 340
U.S. 543, 551-552 (1951).

26. 332 U.S. 301 (1947).
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But the Court refused to create that liability

on the grounds that Congress, as the master of federal fiscal policy, should
prevail in a situation not covered by traditionally established tort law.
In Erie R. R. v. Tompkins, 28 the Supreme Court decided that federal
courts must apply state law when jurisdiction is gained through diversity
of citizenship, but ever since the Erie decision the Court has consistently
applied federal law when the United States sues.29 Until the Standard Oil
case the Court had not considered what law should control when the
Government sued in tort, but prior treatment of Government suits made
it quite apparent that the area of federal law would be extended to tort
claims. Although the particular tort liability sought in the Standard Oil
case was of the nature of a master's suit for injuries to his servant, that
decision represents a close analogy to a suit by the United States for contribution. A prediction as to the outcome of a suit for contribution brought
by the United States against a joint tort-feasor reveals then the following
possibilities.
(1) A recovery if the applicable state law permits. Even apart from
any supposed influence of the Erie decision, the Court in the Standard Oil
case recognized the selection of state law as the applicable federal rule in
some instances.2 0 It seems that a suit by the United States for contribution would be an appropriate instance. As distinguished from the Standard
Oil case, where the peculiar government-soldier relationship was involved,
the United States' action for contribution arises by virtue of its liability
to private citizens under the Act. Since the Act provides for the use of
applicable state law in tort suits against the government, why should not
state law also apply to suits by the government based on its liability under
the Act? Certainly the factors that influenced the Court in the Standard
Oil case are present in a suit by the United States for contribution, viz.,
the concern of the federal purse and the desire for uniformity. But here
Congress, through the Act, has at least implied that its power of the purse
can be exerted through state law and that it does not insist on uniformity
in tort suits between the United States and its citizens. Furthermore,
Justice Burton's assumption in the Yellow Cab case and the legislative
history of the Act l will undoubtedly influence courts to apply state law
27. "...
we know of no good reason why the Government's right to be indemnified in these circumstances, or the lack of such a right, should vary in accordance with the different rulings of the several states, simply because the soldier marches
or today, perhaps as often flies across state lines." Id. at 310.
28. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
29. United States v. Allegheny County, 322 U.S. 174 (1944) ; Clearfield Trust
Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943); Royal Indemnity Co. v. United States,
313 U.S. 289 (1941) ; Comm'r v. United States, 308 U.S. 343 (1939).
30. See RFC v. Beaver County, 328 U.S. 204 (1946); Blair v. Comm'r, 300
U.S. 5 (1936). See Clearfield Trust Company v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 367

(1942).
31. H.R. RiEI. No. 2245, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1942) indicated that "in cases

involving joint tort-feasors the rights and liabilities of the United States will be determined by the local law." This suggestion, however, was not repeated in the report
which accompanied the Act as finally enacted. SEN. REP. No. 1400, 79th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1946).
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where the United States sues for contribution. There is the possibility,
nevertheless, that a court would be reluctant to distinguish the Standard
Oil case and apply state law in view of the substantial diversification of the
law of contribution among the states 8 2 What are the alternatives?
(2) A recovery if the court will find an applicable rule of "federal
common law." The Court in the Standard Oil case was faced with the
unprecedented situation of the Government's suing for a tort committed on
one of its soldiers. It refused to apply the analogy of master-servant or
husband-wife suits on the theory that the creation of a liability for this
unique occurrence should be left to Congress as an incident of its power
over the federal purse. With this precedent, how would a court, faced
with an action by the United States for contribution, react? Very logically
it could say, contribution between joint tort-feasors is not part of the common law of this country,33 and the creation of a right to contribution should
be left to Congress as an incident of its power over the federal purse. This
line of reasoning would lead to the third possibility.
(3) No recovery until an act of Congress so provides. Such a result
would certainly be ludicrous since it would mean, in effect, that the previously well-armored sovereign is now even more vulnerable than private
individuals in like circumstances, a situation that can hardly be attributed
to legislative intent. As mentioned above, there are very rational bases
for distinguishing the Standard Oil case from a suit by the government
for contribution; nevertheless, the remote possibility that it might not be
distinguished creates an awkward state of affairs. The decision allowing
a suit against the United States for contribution in turn creates an inequity
if the United States cannot claim contribution from a private tort-feasor.
To obviate such a contingency, legislation should be passed recognizing
the right of the United States to sue for contribution and indemnity.
Carrying the idea of fairness to its logical conclusion, the applicable substantial law should be that of the state where the injury occurred since it
governs a suit against the United States under the Act.034 This is in
accordance with the conflicts of laws doctrine that the right of a joint tortfeasor to recover contribution is a substantive, and not a remedial, right,
32. For a compilation of the various state decisions and statutes governing contributions see Gottlieb, Some Aspects of Contribution and Indemnity in Tort Actions
Against the United States, 9 FED. B.J. 391, 398-402.
33. Leflar, Contribution and Indemnity Between Tort-feasors, 81 U. OF PA. L.
REv. 130, 131 (1932).
34. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (Supp. 1951). Jn Brown & Root v. United States, 92
F. Supp. 257 (S.D. Tex. 1950) the court said that contribution is permitted under the
Act but Texas law did not allow it in that particular instance.
The notion of fairness mentioned in the text is a relatively new concept where
sovereigns are concerned. The Supreme Court has said that "public policy demands
that the government should occupy an apparently favored position. It may sue;
but except by its own consent, cannot be sued. In matter of costs, it recovers but
does not pay . . . so the statute of limitations may be pleaded by the government
but not against. . . ." United States v. Verdier, 164 U.S. 213, 218 (1896).
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and is therefore governed by the law of the place of the tort and not of
the forum.3 5
JOINDER AND IMPLEADER

In United States v. Sherwood 6 the Supreme Court held that the
Government could not be joined as a co-defendant in suits under the
Tucker Act.L3
The decision was based on two theories: the district courts
under that Act were given jurisdiction concurrent with the Court of
Claims, which had no authority to hear suits between private litigants;
and in the absence of express language in the Act so providing, the Government should not be subjected to the embarrassments which would
attend the defense of suits in which the rights and liabilities of other defendants were also to be fixed.38 This was thought to be in keeping with
the doctrine of strict interpretation of immunity-waiving statutes.
The Sherwood decision had plagued the federal courts since the inception of the Tort Claims Act, at first only in litigation where the United
States was sought to be joined as a co-defendant, and later where the
United States was sought to be impleaded as a third-party defendant. The
first reason for the Sherwood holding is non-existent under this Act since
the district courts are given exclusive jurisdiction in tort claims against
the Government.3 9 On the other hand, the enigmatic "embarrassments"
suggested by the Sherwood Court, although seldom articulated so as to
make sense, coupled with the ever-present doctrine of strict interpretation
40
served to make one-half of the courts confronted with the joinder problem,
41
and two of the three courts confronted with the impleader problem, deny
the use of these procedures under the Act. In holding that the United
States can be impleaded, the Court in the Yellow Cab case distinguished
35. Charnock v. Taylor, 223 N.C. 360, 26 S.E2d 911 (1943); see 148 A.L.R.
1130 (1944).
36. 312 U.S. 584 (1941).
37. The Tucker Act permits suit against the United States on express or impliedin-fact contracts. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a) (Supp. 1951).
38. 312 U.S. 584, 591 (1941).
39. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (Supp. 1951).
40. Joinder denied: Sappington v. Barrett, 182 F.2d 102 (D.C. Cir. 1950);

Donavan v. MacKenna, 80 F. Supp. 690 (D.Mass. 1948); Drummond v. United

States, 78 F. Supp. 730 (D. Va. 1948) ; and a very comprehensive opinion in Uarte v.
United States, 7 F.R.D. 705 (S.D. Cal. 1948). The tremendous influence of the Uarte

case in this area is indicated by statements like this, "the brilliant analysis of judge
Yankwich in Uarte v. United States should settle for all time this matter of joinder.

Sappington v. Prencipe, 87 F. Supp. 357, 359 ,(D. D.C. 1948).
Joinder permitted: State of Maryland v.Manor Real Estate & Trust Co., 83
F. Supp. 91 (D. Md. 1949) ; Bullock v. United States, 72 F. Supp. 445 (D. N.J. 1947);
Englehardt v. United States, 69 F. Supp. 451 (D. Md. 1947).

In the following cases joinder was attempted, but the courts did not pass on the

issue. They dismissed the private joint tort-feasor for lack of federal jurisdiction
since there was no diversity of citizenship between the plaintiffs and private defendants. Prechtl v. United States, 84 F. Supp. 889 (W.D. N.Y. 1947); Dickens v.

Jackson, 71 F. Supp. 753 (E.D. N.Y. 1947).
41. Impleader denied: Pearson v. United States, 15 Fed. Rules Serv. 14a, 114
(S.D. Iowa 1950)

(United States sought to implead private individual); Capital
Impleader permitted:

Transit Co. v. United States, 183 F.2d 825 (D.C. Cir. 1950).

Howey v. Yellow Cab Co., 181 F.2d 967 (3d Cir. 1950).
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the Sherwood decision on the basis that the jurisdiction given the district
courts by the Tort Claims Act is broader than that afforded by the Tucker
Act and, furthermore, that the Sherwood decision involved joinder, not
impleader.
Once the Court had decided that the United States may be sued for
contribution, it was a short step to the proposition that this remedy may
be sought by impleader as well as in an independent action. The Court
found that nothing in the Act requires a procedural distinction to be made
when the United States is sued, and, since the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are applicable to suits under the Act,42 Rule 14(a), which provides
43
for third party practice, indicates that impleader is permitted.
Rule 20(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides for
joinder, 44 and procedural difficulties incident to joinder are the same difficulties which the Court found not insurmountable with regard to impleader.45 This is so because under the provisions of Rule 14(a) the
plaintiff and third-party defendant may assert claims directly against each
other, making the situation identical, at least in this respect, with the
joinder of the United States as a co-defendant. 4 6 It is fair to assume then,
47
that the Court would likewise permit joinder under the Act.
The Need for Joining the United States with Private Tort-fea'sors.In view of the fact that the United States is as financially responsible a
defendant as could be desired, it might seem odd that plaintiffs have been
so desirous of joining private tort-feasors as co-defendants with the Government. 48 Where there is a solvent tort-feasor, however, there are very
practical reasons why a plaintiff's attorney would want to sue him rather
than the Government. The Act limits attorney's fees to 20% of the judgment recovered from the Government. 49 Plaintiff might desire a jury trial
42. The original Act expressly provided that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
are applicable to suits under it. 60 STAT. 842, § 411 (1946). In the revision of title
28 this section was omitted as unnecessary since the rules apply to all civil actions.
SEN. REP. No. 1559, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1948).
43. FED. R. Civ. P. 14(a) provides that ". . . a defendant may move . . . for
leave as a third-party plaintiff to serve a summons and complaint upon a person not
a party to the action who is or may be liable for all or part of the plaintiff's claim
against him."
44. FED. R. Civ. P. 20(a) provides that "All persons may be joined in one action
as defendants if there is asserted against them jointly, severally or in the alternative,
any right to relief in respect of or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or
series of transactions or occurrences and if any question of law or fact common to all
of them will arise in the action."
45. United States v. Yellow Cab Co., Capital Transit Company v. United States,
340 U.S. 543, 555 (1951), these "difficulties" are discussed infra.
46. See Pearson v. United States, 15 Fed. Rules Serv. 14a, 114 (S.D. Iowa 1950).
47. The early legislative history of the Act indicates that the Act does not permit
any person to be joined as a defendant with the United States. H.R. REP. No. 1287,
79th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1945). This is not conclusive, however, since the report
accompanying the Act as finally enacted made no reference to the problem of joinder.
SEN. REP. No. 1400, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946).
48. This was the judge's opinion in Dickens v. Jackson, 71 F. Supp. 753 (E.D.
N.Y. 1947).
49. 28 U.S.C. § 2678 (Supp. 1951).
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which is unavailable in suits against the Government.50 Experienced
lawyers realize the red tape and delay incident to the collection of judgments from the Government. 51
But regardless of the advantages or disadvantages of suing one rather
than the other, in the ordinary situation the plaintiff will find it advisable
to join the United States and the private tort-feasor as co-defendants.
Almost every case involving joinder under the Act has involved an automobile accident where a vehicle driven by a government employee collided
52
with one driven by a private individual resulting in the plaintiff's injury.
In such an event it is practically impossible for the plaintiff to know
whether both, either or neither of the drivers were wrongdoers; therefore
53
he is forced to sue them as joint tort-feasors.
Except for the very first case which involved joinder under the Act,
the Government has vigorously resisted the use of this procedure.5 4 But
those courts which have been persuaded by the Government's argument
have not absolved it from liability where the United States and a private
defendant were sued jointly. Instead, where joinder has been denied the
private defendant has been dropped from the suit, retaining the United
States as the sole defendant.5 5 In the light of this result, why has the
Government persisted in its opposition to joinder?
Fear of Collusion Between the Plaintiff and the Private Defendant.Secret agreements of this sort are possible whenever there are joint de50. 28 U.S.C. § 2402 (Supp. 1951).
51. See Tooze, Uncle Sam--a Tort-feasor, 29 ORE. L. REv. 245, 256 (1950).
In Englehardt v. United States, 69 F. Supp. 451 (D. Md. 1947), plaintiff recovered a
$3,000 judgment from the United States and the private defendant. Joseph 0. Kaiser,
Esq., attorney for the plaintiff in that case writes "the insurance company for the
individual defendant promptly paid one-half of the $3,000.00. After considerable delay,
the Government paid the other half." Letter from Mr. Kaiser, dated February 23,

1951.

52. The only joinder case which didn't involve an automobile accident was State
of Maryland v. Manor Real Estate & Trust Co., 83 F. Supp. 91 (D. Md. 1949), where

the Government was sued as the lessor of an apartment building.
53. This was the reason for joinder of the United States with a private defendant
in Englehardt v. United States, 69 F. Supp. 451 (D. Md. 1947). Letter from Joseph
0. Kaiser, Esq., plaintiff's attorney, dated February 23, 1951. It was likewise the
reason for joinder in Bullock v. United States, 72 F. Supp. 445 (D. N.J. 1947).
Letter from Abraham L. Honigfeld, Esq., attorney for the plaintiff, dated February
28, 1951.
54. The Government argued for joinder in Englehardt v. United States, 69 F.
Supp. 451 (D. Md. 1947), but the United States Attorney in Baltimore, Maryland,
who represented the Government in that case, has had a change of heart since that
time. "However, in retrospect and growth in wisdom and understanding since the
trial of the Englehardt case, this office now is of the opinion that an individual joint
tort-feasor should not be joined as a defendant with the government. . . ." Letter
from Bernard J. Flynn, Esq., United States Attorney in Baltimore, Maryland, dated
March 7, 1951.
Since this letter was written after the Supreme Court's decision on impleader
was handed down, it might indicate that the Government doesn't intend to give up its
opposition on joinder under the Act.
55. See, for example, Drummond v. United States, 78 F. Supp. 730 (D. Va. 1948);
Uarte v. United States, 7 F.R.D. 705 (S.D. Cal. 1948). Misjoinder of parties is not a
ground for dismissal of the action. There is dismissal as to the "misjoined" party,
but any claim may be severed and proceeded with separately. 28 U.S.C. FED. R. Civ.
P. 21 (Supp. 1951).
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fendants. However, there is no reason why collusion against the Government would be more likely than collusion against an insurance company or
self-insurer under similar circumstances. Besides, if a person is dishonest
he might defraud the Government through false claims, padded medical
bills or other devious means that have no relation whatsoever to joinder.
Admitting that the Government's fear of foul play is justifiable and based
on actuality, 56 it must be presumed, nevertheless, that when the sovereign's
immunity to suit is waived, the sovereign assumes the risk of the low moral
character of some litigants.
PROCEDURAL DIFFICULTIES

Certain provisions of the Act make proceedings under it different
from litigation between private individuals. Hence, when one trial involves claims against the Government and against a private tort-feasor,
these provisions cause difficulties which some courts have called paradoxical and indicative that Congress did not intend joinder,5" and which
other courts have found not insurmountable. 58
The "difficulty" most often suggested arises because private litigants
are entitled to a jury trial if they so desire, whereas the Act provides that
suits against the United States should be tried by the court.59 Thus, when
plaintiff sues defendant and the United States jointly and both defendants
plead contributory negligence, it is possible for the jury to find defendant
liable while the judge absolves the United States on the same defense.
Likewise, if both triers of fact find for plaintiff, it is possible that the damages awarded by the jury will far exceed those awarded by the court. It
is submitted that these possibilities have received undue attention since
they are more theoretical than real. As a practical matter the court will
follow the jury verdict if it is not unreasonable or give judgment n. o. v.
in accordance with its own view of the facts if the verdict seems clearly
wrong.60 By the same token, the court's award of damages will coincide
with the jury's award unless the latter is excessive in which case the court
56. ". . . it has been the experience of this office in cases where a joint tortfeasor was joined as a defendant with the government in the first instance and in cases
where this office brought in a joint tortfeasor under the Third Party Practice (Rule
14) that the plaintiff and the original defendant or impleaded defendant 'ganged up'
against the government in an effort to thrust the liability solely on the government."
Letter from Bernard J. Flynn, Esq., United States Attorney in Baltimore, Maryland,
dated March 7, 1951.
57. See Capital Transit Co. v. United States, 183 F2d 825 (D.C. Cir. 1950);
Uarte v. United States, 7 F.R.D. 705 (S.D. Cal. 1948).
58. See Howey v. Yellow Cab Co., 181 F.2d 967 (3d Cir. 1950); Englehardt
v. United States, 69 F. Supp. 451 (D. Md. 1947).
59. See notes 12 and 13 supra. Comparison might be made with the procedure
utilized where law and equity issues are tried in one trial. In that situation, however,
the judge and jury try different issues; whereas here they both try the same issues.
Cf. Elkins v. Nobel, 1 F.R.D. 357 (E.D. N.Y. 1940).
60. One commentator has suggested that the jury be used in an advisory capacity
according to Rule 39(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 62 Halv. L. REv.
321, 323 (1948).
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would probably order a remittitur. 61 The rare case in which the final
determination of the Government's liability will differ from the final determination of the private defendant's liability is certainly no reason to deny
joinder because such a variance would be even more probable should the
2
plaintiff sue the individual and the Government in two separate suits.
Where evidence is offered that would be admissible before the judge
but not before the jury, the jury can be dismissed. If necessary, the court
can even order separate trials in accordance with Rule 42(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
The Act provides that the Court of Claims shall have jurisdiction of
appeals from judgments rendered in the district courts in suits brought
63
under the Act, provided that there is written consent of the appellees;
otherwise, appeals are taken to the circuit courts. It has been said that if
joinder is allowed, the Court of Claims might have to review jury verdicts,
a function which would be foreign to its jurisdiction.0 4 This suggestion
has no foundation in fact. If plaintiff joins defendant with the United
States and recovers against both, the United States alone can appeal to
the Court of Claims since the Act allows appeal to that court only from
judgments in suits brought under the Act. The fact that the suit against
defendant is joined with a suit under the Act should not give defendant
the right to appeal to the Court of Claims and defendant would have to
appeal to the circuit court. This does not mean, however, that plaintiff
would be forced to litigate separate appeals because plaintiff can refuse to
consent to the Government's appeal to the Court of Claims, thus forcing
both defendants to appeal to the circuit court. If plaintiff should lose in
the trial court, he could appeal from defendant's judgment to the circuit
court and, with the consent of the United States, from its judgment to the
Court of Claims. As a matter of convenience and economy, however,
plaintiff would probably appeal only to the circuit court.0 5
Regulation of Fees.-The section of the Act which is bound to cause
trouble when the United States is joined with another defendant is the one
that limits attorney's fees to 20% of the judgment under the Act "if recovery be had." 66 This provision has been severely criticized by the legal
profession which has urged its repeal with great vehemence--"If it be not
[repealed], then look for more statutes progressively driving at the lawyer
61. An order that the plaintiff remit part of his judgment or subject himself to a

new trial has been approved by the Supreme Court in Northern Pacific R. Co. v.
Herbert, 116 U.S. 642, 646-647 (1886).
Additur, however, has been held uncon-

stitutional, Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474 (1935).
62. See 99 U. OF PA. L. REv. 714 (1951).
63. 28 U.S.C. § 1504 (Supp. 1951).

64. Capital Transit Co. v. United States, 183 F2d 825, 828-829 (D.C. Cir. 1950);

Drummond v. United States, 78 F. Supp. 730, 732 ('D. Va. 1948).
65. Since the Court of Claims sits only at Washington, D.C. [28 U.S.C. § 174
(Supp. 1951)] most appeals from district courts outside of the District of Columbia
will be taken to the circuit courts throughout the country.
66. 28 U.S.C. § 2678 (Supp. 1951).
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-the one man that is feared most by those who love tyranny." 67 The
provision has been explained as being in conformity with stipulations
usually found in private bills passed by Congress. It is further supported
on the ground that the defendant here is solvent, a fact said to warrant
reducing the average contingent fee.68
The rule becomes clumsy' where plaintiff joins defendant and the
United States, recovers judgment against both, and each defendant pays
one-half of the damages.69 Should the 20% rule apply to the whole recovery, to the part paid by the Government or not at all? Should it make
a difference if plaintiff sues defendant, who impleads the United States for
contribution? In this situation plaintiff recovers only from defendant and
defendant collects one-half of the judgment from the Government."0 The
ultimate result is the same except that here the limitation on attorney's
fees could not possibly apply to the plaintiff because he did not sue under
the Act nor recover from the United States. But a literal reading of the
Act would impose the limitation on the fees of the attorney who represented
the original defendant in the impleader for contribution from the government since that was a suit under the Act. It is submitted that the limitation on attorney's fees will be applied in any situation to the amount recovered from the government under the Act whether by way of direct
damages or by way of contribution or indemnity. That is the only feasible
method of applying the rule.
CONCLUSION

A large majority of the cases that have been decided under the Act
have involved automobile accidents. 71 Since it is common in accident
litigation to have more than one person who might be at fault, it is not
surprising that the law of contribution and indemnity, and the procedural
devices of joinder and impleader have received much attention. These
remedies and procedures are called into play to ameliorate some of the
hardships attendant on the litigation of cases where there is possibility of
liability of more than one tort-feasor.
Suit against the United States for contribution or indemnity is desirable not only from the standpoint of imposing liability where the fault
lies, but also in the light of the more modern approach toward distributing
loss over the greatest number of people.72 Appropriate legislation, as
67. Gellhorn & Schenck, Tort Actions Against the Federal Government, 47 CoL.
L. REv. 722, 734 (1947).
68. See Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,S. 2690, 76th Cong.,

3d Sess. 14-16, 40-41 (1940) ; HearingsBefore the House Committee on the Judiciary,
H.R. 7236, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 13, 22 (1940).
69. This was the actual outcome of Englehardt v. United States, 69 F. Supp.
451 (D. Md. 1947).
70. This was the final result in Howey v. Yellow Cab Co., 181 F.2d 967 (3d

Cir. 1950).
71. Motor vehicle accidents make up more than 50% of all claims filed under the
Act. See tables, Note, 9 OHIO ST. L.J. 471, 489-490 (1948).

72. See James, Contribution Among Joint Tort-feasors: A Pragmatic Criticism,

54 HARv. L. REv. 1156 (1941).
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pointed out earlier, can adequately solve the problems which are inevitable
consquences of this hitherto unknown governmental liability. In summary,
these amendments are:
1) Where the United States is sued or impleaded for contribution or indemnity under this Act, the district court in which such
action is brought shall not be bound by any prior determination of
the amount of damages for which the plaintiff in such action was
found liable. It may redetermine the damages and grant contribution
or indemnity according to its own determination.
2) A claim for contribution or indemnity under this Act must
be brought within six months of the time when such claim accrues
or within two years of the time when the injury to person or property
that gave rise to the claim occurs, whichever period is longer.
3) The United States may sue or implead any person for contribution or indemnity in any circumstances where such a suit can
be brought by a private individual. The applicable substantive law
shall be that of the state where the injury that gave rise to the action
occurred.
The use of joinder and impleader to accomplish in one trial what
would otherwise require two is advantageous in saving the time and money
of the litigants as well as freeing the heavily loaded dockets of the district
courts z3 With the use of discretion by the trial judges, the procedural
difficulties that have been overemphasized by the Government, will vanish
into the realm of pure theory. But even if the lower federal courts should
adopt a liberal construction of the Act, difficulties will still arise since the
Government will surely insist that, if it must be treated as a private individual, 74 at least the courts should accord it the respect due a giant
among men.
Murry J. Waldman
73. The increase in the number of cases under the Act, "especially the sharp rise
in the number of motor-vehicle accident cases in 1949," accounts for a large proportion of the heavy burden on the district courts. REPORT OF THE DnRECTo OF THE
ADmINISTRATrVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES CouRTs

45 (1950).

74. The Act provides that the United States will be liable "if a private person
would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act
or omission occurred." 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (Supp. 1951).

